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Abstract
This paper discusses the promises and limits of a Peircean semiotic approach to the concept of style in law.
It does so in two steps: first (1) by identifying the place of style within the structure of law as a system of
signs, then (2) by conceptualising the link between law and style in the thought of C.S. Peirce and high-
lighting some of the insights from a Peircean take on legal semiotics that may contribute to our under-
standing of the role of style in making meaning in law. It is argued that, for a Peircean analysis of law,
three levels can be distinguished, from the ‘surface structure’ down to the ‘deep structure’. It is at the mid-
dle level (that of the ‘basic structure’) that a semiotic approach can yield coherent insights in terms of style,
by examining the symbols and metaphors that make for the expressibility of ‘habits’, namely experience-
based patterns of action and interpretation.
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1 Introduction
Conceptions and uses of ‘legal style’ abound. We speak of lawyers’ style in terms of language, of judi-
cial style in terms of argumentative patterns and, notoriously, of style elements in comparing legal sys-
tems. These uses are difficult to refer to some common conceptual core. What is apparent, however, is
that, in our usage, we tend to focus on the aspect of style related to perception, most often as a means
of classifying the objects of our experience based on how they appear to us. Yet the other aspect – that
of choices and (more or less conscious) efforts to make a certain kind of appearance – always lurks in
the background, making a unified explanation even more problematic.
This paper looks at the concept of style from the perspective of legal semiotics. In fact, each of the uses
mentioned above has found their reflections in semiotically informed legal studies.1 What a semiotic
approach to the concept of style can offer for legal studies is a way of understanding how ‘style’ emerges
in law andwhatmakes it ‘legal’. In what follows, we seek to explore the promises and limits of a specific cur-
rent within semiotics initiated byC.S. Peirce and applied in the field of lawmost notably by R. Kevelson.We
shall do so in two steps. The first part identifies the place of style in the structure of law as a system of signs,
also situating itwith reference to (aMannheimianunderstanding of) the concept of culture. The secondpart
deals with the conceptual links between law and style as appearing in the thought of Peirce, to highlight the
elements of his theory that are useful for understanding how style works in law. Finally, we provide a sum-
mary picture based on these insights, linking it to those formulated in law and semiotics scholarship.
2 Style and structure in legal culture
What are we looking for when examining legal style? What is ‘style’ in law and how does it become
‘legal’? As has been noted in the field of legal semiotics, law is ‘a double semiotic system’ (Jackson,
© Cambridge University Press 2019
1On lawyers’ style, see Jackson (1995, pp. 93–98); on the semiotic interest of argumentative patterns, see Balkin (1991); for
a semiotic analysis of a specific legal culture, see e.g. Tiefenbrun (2007).
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1985) in the sense that, within the legal system of signs, the attribution of meaning is directed by both
the rules of language and those of the law itself. In so far as the latter are not inherent in language, the
specifically legal character of any expression only appears in the context of communication and
depends on the situations, means, actors and addressees in, by and to which it is applied (semiotic
group) (Jackson, 1985). For instance, unless one wishes to argue for the existence of law as a separate
language, with no reference to natural languages, one cannot show the difference between a judicial
decision and a novel in terms of the grammar used, just as there is no difference between the judge’s
robe and an overcoat in terms of being clothes.
In the terminology of structural linguistics, the ‘deep structure’ and the ‘surface structure’ (see
Chomsky, 1964) can be opposed here, with the insight that it is to the latter that various concepts
of ‘legal style’ can be applied. In terms of the former, both stylistic differences and the ‘legal’ quality
are impossible to grasp. Style in general, and legal style in particular, could then be investigated by
focusing on surface characteristics (see Eco, 2004), using empirical methods. The inclination of
Hungarian lawyers to use Latin terms or to omit definite articles when drafting legal documents
are observations that can be made by comparing and contrasting various groups of texts. Based on
that, the ‘legal’ genre might be distinguished from others.
Yet, already, the earliest accounts of (speech) style attribute specific (rhetorical) functions to the
various stylistic types, which cannot be accounted for purely in terms of perceptions. Making sense
of ‘stylistic’ phenomena presupposes sharing a framework of reference, within which meaning can
be attributed to the differences observed. Such frameworks can emerge on the basis of experience
or as results of choices and decisions. To come back to the example of clothing: one may perceive
many differences between the judge’s robe and one’s own overcoat, and still not identify it as a
sign or mistake it for a different one, if one does not know the ‘code’ directing the interpretation
of signs within the given system.2
If we go beyond the field of law and attribute such frameworks (codes) to cultures in general (see
Posner, 2004), then two levels of cultural communities can be distinguished: an explicit or ‘overt’ cul-
ture and an implicit or ‘covert’ culture.3 The overt culture can be described as the surface structure of
the respective system of signs, while its covert counterpart as the characteristics of the deep structure.
These latter often remain unreflected, even unconscious, and appear at the level of linguistic expression
as metaphoric signs.
Stylistic individuality of the surface thus seems to be a transformed version of deep structure ele-
ments.4 What we typically find at the latter level is a system of schemes and patterns (of action), having
almost unlimited ways of transformation at the surface level, according to the characteristics of the
respective system of signs. A number of patterns and conventions have emerged through time, govern-
ing the creation and reception of signs, as well as their uses, sometimes without being reflected upon.
In stylistic scholarship, these are often termed ‘cognitive frameworks’ or ‘scripts’.5 It is these schemes
that set the limits for the possible directions of interpretation and action, thus showing the determin-
ing influence of the deep structure. On a psychologising account, that influence may be explained with
an instinctive, often unconscious, striving for safety and transparency. The increasing complexity and
indeed intricacy of sign processes make it necessary to recur to simplified patterns of action, which are,
as it were, condensed forms of historical experience, usually appearing in the form of metaphors, sym-
bols or tropes (cf. Geertz, 1973, pp. 172–198). Law is no exception, being one of the symbolic dimen-
sions of social action, with its simplifications serving orientation and interpretation.
2See e.g. H. Szilágyi (2005, p. 136), quoting a person who has misread the judges’ dress code, saying ‘I thought them priests’.
3For the distinction, based on the linguistic theory of W. von Humboldt, see Stepanov (1971), arguing that elements of the
implicit (covert) culture differ among national cultures, each forming separate systems. When used for sign systems, the con-
cept of culture does not have to be limited to nations or other particular groups (cf. Posner, 2004).
4On the correlation of deep and surface structures, shaping the style of the text, see e.g. Weinrich (1966).
5In terms of style, see Pethő (2011, p. 17) on the necessity for identifying the ‘structure of meaning’ (the conscious or
unconscious model underlying the creation of any text, as a first step of interpretation).
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Moreover, even within the ‘overt’ culture, legal signs belong to a specific field, a subculture, and can
be identified as such only by reference to a deeper level of signification. Using the previous example, it
is within the ‘overt’ culture that one can observe how judges are recognised in court from their robes.
Yet the use of that sign is not entirely based on a general cultural convention, but is at least partly
governed by conventions inherent in the ‘legal’ subculture. While it is easily observed that certain peo-
ple wearing a certain kind of outfit play a specific role in a given context, the question of why that
happens can be only answered with reference to rules that form the deep level of signification. Part
of the answer comes from such general conventions within a given culture such as the use of dressing
to convey meaning, through colours, tailoring and other features. But, due to that generality, that is not
where the subsystems of signs, the subcultures, can be found. The other part of the answer must then
come from a higher level that is still below the surface. When acting as a judge, the judge is using his or
her robe as a sign, but does not give an account of why and how (s)he is entitled to use it. Nor do
judges make explicit the metaphoric character of their robes (as signs of power, separation and so on).
In the case of law as a system of rules, we find a structure comprising a network of alternatives of
action. Choice among these alternatives is limited by the cultural context, the particular situation and
the place of the individual in both of these.6 Yet, if the ‘legal’ quality of style cannot be grasped at the
level of the deep structure, and nevertheless being perceived at the surface, and if law has got its own
stylistic constraints influencing the surface structure, then it seems to be in order to describe these lat-
ter at a middle level. That level of signification, perhaps best termed the ‘basic structure’, already con-
tains what may be regarded as possible (‘legal’) forms of action and whichever is going to become
actual needs to fit into the framework thus constrained. ‘Legal’ patterns of action, and their emergence,
are influenced by the cultural aspects of the given society.7 These latter, ‘meta-juristic’ elements, also
parts of the basic structure, thus leave their traces on whatever is understood by ‘legal style’.8
Influences are not unidirectional, though. There is some kind of a feedback from the ‘higher’ levels
of the system to the ‘lower’ ones as well. Codes of meaning-making are shaped by the very practice of
communication making use of them. The patterns and conventions just mentioned condense such
ever-changing practices of actualising and individualising. For instance, the fact that judges wear a cer-
tain type of robes will also constitute some kind of a constraint for further signification. If one wishes
to express something through dressing, one will have to take that into account, both as a specific sign
(that is now ‘taken’, i.e. one should not dress as a judge unless one wishes to be identified as a judge)
and as part of a wider practice of using sartorial signs to refer to social roles.
Looking at the ‘style’ of law with the aim to identify and understand its ‘tropes’ and ‘figures’ does
not therefore mean to seek to discover an abstract structure of ideas. The patterns that direct action
and interpretation are based on experience, namely human reactions to the surrounding social reality,
which are becoming increasingly ‘dense’ with the increasing complexity of sign processes that is due to
the feedback. That reality does, without doubt, have its aesthetic as well as ideological dimensions, but
the first thing to investigate is how the mechanism of signification works and it is here that C.S.
Peirce’s approach may prove helpful.
Unlike the structuralist analysis of signs, having its origins in the structural linguistics of F. Saussure
and based on the distinction of ‘signifier’ and ‘signified’ (cf. Saussure, 2011, p. 133), Peircean semiotics
examines the triadic relationship between the ‘sign’ (as a physical phenomenon), the ‘object’ (the
6Jackson (1985; 1988) describes that in terms of a Greimasian (structuralist) ‘narrative grammar’, claiming that the choice
between alternatives of action is more limited in law than in other types of discourse. Analysing trial cases, Jackson empha-
sises that what judges do is actually evaluating and selecting (fictitious, false or true) ‘stories’. In doing so, they first decide
about the credibility of narratives, which is determined by culture and social consensus. The ‘truth’ of a story is thus influ-
enced by the already existing patterns, abstracted from earlier cases (similar to the one currently before the court). Therefore,
whether a story is credible depends on how it fits into one of these narrative frames.
7See Mannheim (1982), with note 9 below.
8For an early example, see John Henry Wigmore’s A Panorama of the World’s Legal Systems (1928), in which photographic
reproductions of architecture and sculpture are meant to illustrate how artistic style correlates with the ‘style of law’ in a given
society.
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specific part of the world the sign refers to) and the ‘interpretant’ (the meaning of the sign, i.e. the
effect it has on the mind interpreting it) (see Jackson, 1985). The last element of the model is import-
ant for us here, for two reasons. On the one hand, the interpretant highlights the element of perception
that is key for understanding style. On the other hand, according to Peirce, the interpretant is a sign
itself, with its own triadic structure, which emphasises the dynamic continuity of the sign process that
is present in the functioning of style, too.
In terms of interpretation, the role of style is that, through it, a given sociocultural system is direct-
ing individuals’ interpretive activity in a certain direction. At the surface level, that is informed by the
primary (and explicit) objectives of the given social system; that is, here we are dealing with a con-
scious effort to direct interpretation. At the basic level, in turn, what governs the interpretation of
signs are those patterns that constitute a ‘community of experience’ in the Mannheimian sense.9 In
other words, the effect of the stylistic elements of the surface level depends on the meaning (interpre-
tant) attributed to them by the recipients (interpreters). That, in turn, is based on their interpretive
frameworks (described by Peirce’s concept of ‘habit’; see the next section). The totality of interpretive
patterns (which can be described as a ‘total cultural style’ or ‘worldview’ of the given society) ensures
that the social effects of signs remain homogeneous – that is, that the different objectives of specific
subsystems do not scatter their use.10 Still, the attribution of meaning by the individual recipient is a
necessary condition and it requires the surface structure of any utterance to fit into the particular
framework governing the individual’s interpretation.11 If that latter condition is not obtained, then
the addressees will not be able to make sense of the message, which then cannot have any effect.
Condensed sets of experiences tend to appear through contrasts such as those of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ or
‘right’ and ‘wrong’. It has been observed that, in the field of politics, metaphors and symbols play the
role of simplifying intricate experiences that normally provoke fear or uncertainty.12 Political events
are typically characterised by a level of complexity that evokes a human desire for a structured and
transparent order (see Edelman, 1964). Yet, transparency and simplification are only part of the mat-
ter. Given that human actors do not generally have access to the set of complex experiences that
brought about the pattern of action in question, they may be easily manipulated by those in a position
to influence the use of signs.13
The tendency to govern the making of meaning seems to be even stronger in law (see Mannheim,
1982), given the function of legal rules to make their addressees conform to their provisions. Yet,
addressees’ likeliness to obey requires that they be capable of interpreting the rule, in terms of form
as well as content. This highlights that it is not only the form (style) of the message that has an impact
9Mannheim, too, emphasised the influence of the deep structure on style (as part of the culture). On his account, experi-
ences of a given period and nation are condensed into a ‘community context of experience’, i.e. a framework of action and
interpretation. These ‘contexts of experience’ then enable the interpreters to grasp the content of cultural products in a col-
lectively valid way. Thus, sociocultural objects are examined in a homogeneous dimension, allowing an effective dialogue
between interpreters. Throughout that dialogue, the ‘context of experience’ provides the common denominator, helping to
limit the (virtually unlimited) number of possible interpretations. For Mannheim, examining style means seeking to get
an insight into the worldview of a particular period, which, however, shows different faces, depending on the aspect (art,
religion, politics, etc.) through which it is approached (cf. Mannheim, 1982, p. 92).
10As Mannheim (1982, p. 92) puts it, the ‘set of experiences’ underlying different social objects is the same, making ‘the
same “spirit” [express] itself in these differing cultural objectivations’.
11Cf. Bencze’s (2015) interesting example of the ‘breach of style’ from the field of judicial reasoning. He argues that, due to
the conventional use of certain ways of editing and means of legal argumentation, judicial reasoning follows a more or less
uniform style. In cases of departure from that received style, one may suspect that the substance of the reasons offered is
unsatisfactory (either insufficient or irrelevant), since a different style indicates that the decision made by the judge cannot
be justified in the ‘conventional way’. That, to be sure, does not necessarily mean that the judgment is substantively wrong.
Studying such cases of uneven style may nevertheless provide a ‘diagnostic device’ for highlighting the necessity for further
investigations concerning a particular judgment; see Bencze (2015, pp. 131–138).
12Such interpretive frameworks are particularly frequent in religion and politics, the fields traditionally linked to non-
rational action (cf. Edelman, 1964, pp. 178–180).
13It has been argued, however, that examining metaphors may lead to that sort of political knowledge; cf. Miller (1979).
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on the situation, but also the given circumstances may enforce a modification of the form.14 Thus,
frameworks of action and interpretation cannot be regarded as some constant (and intuitively access-
ible) point of departure but, due to the circumstances, further layers of meaning appear on them (as a
result of the dynamic functioning of signs).15
One may describe the legal system of signs, too, as one directed at the production of a structure of
domination, based on the influence of power. In analysing the legal discourse, Van Fleet (2011) used
one of the Lacanian types of discourse – the ‘Master Discourse’ – as an analogy. The underlying par-
allel is that of the relationship between master and subject, with the latter lacking the necessary
amount of experience and therefore being compelled to obey the master’s commands with no possi-
bility of raising questions (cf. Van Fleet, 2011, pp. 60–61). Looking at the sign processes of law, how-
ever, it needs to be pointed out that the interpretant still has a key role. In the triadic relation of the
legal system of signs, the interpretant may bring about a gap, often frustrating the law’s efforts to dom-
inate. The reason for that is the connection between the meaning of a sign and the principles and
requirements of other systems of signs (see Van Fleet, 2011, pp. 57–72), namely the fact that the
experience underlying the principles governing a person’s actions is a complex one, not only legal,
but also moral, cultural, etc. Otherwise put, it is due to the interpretant that the law as a system of
signs fits into a broader cultural framework. The various social and cultural manifestations of a ‘spirit’,
shaped through a series of experiences, are therefore the products of continuous interpreting activity.
The role and functioning of the production of such frameworks of interpretation, the making of
meaning in law through style, may perhaps be adequately described on the basis of the pragmatist
semiotics of Charles S. Peirce. There are three features of Peirce’s theory that seem to be very close
to the above considerations. First, according to Peirce, the production of new signs is limited (by
the ‘deep structure’) in terms of what signs to create and how to do that. Second, the cognitive and
interpretive capacities of the interpreter play an important role in the functioning of signs. And,
third, the concept of ‘habit’ (customs, schemes, patterns) is of key importance in understanding the
increasing complexity of sign processes. In the following sections, we first summarise what elements
of the Peircean tradition of semiotics seem useful in conceptualising style, then we look at the insights
offered by that tradition in the field of legal semiotics.
3 A Peircean approach to style
As has been pointed out above, if law has got a ‘style’, then its importance lies in the effect it has
through directing human action. That insight is rather close to the key tenet of Peircean pragmatism,
according to which the content of any concept consists in its influence on human behaviour (cf. CP
5.438).16 In a similar vein, one of the leading legal semioticians of the twentieth century, Roberta
Kevelson, argued that legal practice and legal discourse are, in fact, the best illustrations for the essence
of pragmatist theory (see Kevelson, 1986, pp. 355–371) and not only because lawyerly thinking had a
considerable role in shaping Peirce’s thought.17
14See Lasswell (1965, p. 66): ‘When fighting, the physical material of utterances is very dense, sometimes resembling the
model of a missile.’
15In contrast, the rigid structure of stylistic elements on the surface may indicate the tendency of the social regime to elim-
inate the influence of interpretive habits on the interpreters (preventing, as far as possible, the addressees of the law from
intuitively realising the inadequacy of a given provision or the regime as a whole).
16References to Peirce’s works give volume and paragraph numbers of Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce (Hartshorne
and Weiss, 1932–1958), abbreviated as ‘CP’, and The Essential Peirce (Houser and Kloesel, 1992), abbreviated as ‘EP’.
17Pragmatism as a philosophical current appeared in the US towards the end of the nineteenth century. It was in his 1878
paper, ‘How to make our ideas clear?’ (CP 5.388–410), that Peirce first introduced the concept into philosophical discourse.
According to the central tenet of pragmatism, truth means usefulness, i.e. the truth of a judgment consists of its practical
applicability. However, Peirce claimed that the name ‘pragmatism’ was actually coined by a lawyer, Nicholas St. John
Green, one of the jurists in the Metaphysical Club, through whom Peirce’s conception contributed to setting the theoretical
basis to American legal realism (cf. Kevelson, 1987, p. 9). Peirce described him as one of the most interesting members,
reputed as a learned and skilled lawyer. His influence on Peirce’s conception can be detected primarily in his emphasis
on the importance of Alexander Bain’s definition of ‘belief’, which he urged to apply in connection with reality.
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Although Peirce constructed no specific theory of style, his semiotics nevertheless allows the recon-
struction of a teleological concept of style that helps to answer the question of how elements of style
can have an effect: what is the process of style and what is the goal of that process? In other words, a
Peircean approach can contribute to the understanding of the link between style and the interpretant,
thereby offering a new perspective on the functioning of style. To lay that out, we need to look at three
of the key themes of pragmatist semiotics: (1) the dynamic and teleological character of sign processes
(‘semiosis’); (2) the stages of human thought (‘belief’, ‘doubt’ and ‘habit’); and (3) Peirce’s phenom-
enological categories (‘Firstness’, ‘Secondness’ and ‘Thirdness’). This section summarises the insights
Peircean semiotics can offer us in these fields, together with those of twentieth-century legal
semiotics.
3.1 Semiosis as a dynamic and teleological process
As we have seen, pragmatist semiotics describes semiosis as a dynamic process comprising three ele-
ments: the ‘sign’, the ‘interpretant’ and the ‘object’. Thus, the sign process works not in isolation, but is
extended to the context in which it can come to have effect, namely to its sociocultural relations. That
triadic process then keeps on regenerating itself, thereby producing further signs as the result of con-
tinuously interpreting new information (cf. CP 2.230–232). Throughout that process, the interpretant
(i.e. the meaning of the sign) brings about new signs, while being limited in what signs and how it can
be created.18
Moreover, Peircean semiotics is also teleological in the sense that the continuous production of
signs takes place for the sake of achieving a certain goal: knowledge. That is, however, never free
from problems, as everything in the process depends on the interpreter’s capacity to interpret cor-
rectly. One should also bear in mind that it is through that continuous process of interpretation
that signification is becoming increasingly complicate. On Peirce’s account, then, signs may be mis-
leading and human thinking fallible.19 Some patterns (that proved to be useful in similar cases in
the past) serving as a point of orientation for interpretation, and hence for human action, are
necessary.
The use of these patterns can be best described through Peirce’s concept of ‘abduction’. Although
his use of the term was not quite consistent, from the perspective of style, we may understand it both
as a weak form of inference and a way of generating ideas (for the distinction, see Paavola, 2005). In
the first case, abduction works through analogy: if we know that a certain feature characterises a group
of objects and see that a given object shares that feature, we may suspect that it belongs to that group
(cf. CP 2.623). In the second case, the starting point is the observation of something unexpected and
the new idea is a possible explanation for it (cf. CP 5.189). The first way of using abduction appears,
for instance, in the classificatory uses of ‘legal style’, while we may see the second one at work in cases
where a ‘breach of style’ is perceived.
Peirce gives an outline of how these schemes are generated and also how they work. In pragmatist
terminology, these patterns of schemes of action are ‘habits’, produced through the process called ‘the
chain of thinking’, which comprises three steps: ‘belief’, ‘doubt’ and ‘habit’.
According to Bain, ‘belief’ is the condition that makes the individual ready for action (cf. CP 5.12, quoted by Colapietro, 2008,
p. 226, and Bergman, 2009, p. 15). Concepts and expressions can be understood only by way of investigating and examining
their practical consequences (James, 1907, p. 147). On the pragmatist account, the world is created in a way that it is only
through the sphere of publicly verifiable things and phenomena that any statement concerning an utterance can be successful.
As we are going to see presently, however, Peircean pragmatism does leave some role to elements that cannot be verified
empirically.
18As Peirce (CP 2.230) put it: ‘the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will
be a Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make up
a still larger Sign.’
19In his 1868 paper, ‘Some consequences of four incapacities’, Peirce explains how cognitive and interpretive capacities are
limited, discussing what he regards as the four basic incapacities of human beings (lack of introspection and intuition, no
capability to think without using signs and ‘no conception of the absolutely incognizable’; CP 5.266).
268 Bettina Bor and Miklós Könczöl
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744552319000272
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 80.98.248.173, on 30 Dec 2019 at 21:49:50, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
3.2 The ‘chain of thinking’
On a Peircean account, the functionality of human thinking means that each person acts on motiva-
tions whose effects are known to correspond to the expectations that form the starting point of human
action. Thus, individuals act on the basis of beliefs that have been tried and checked, either personally
or socially. The function of thinking is to produce belief (cf. CP 5.396), which then determines the way
for action. The thought content of beliefs is conveyed to human beings primarily by way of linguistic
expression. That said, beliefs that form the basis of frameworks of experience are by no means
conscious. More specifically, they cannot be described as being conscious of an action, or as a state
of mind, but the inclination to act and to function (cf. Colapietro, 2008, p. 226). Yet, in certain
situations, one cannot decide in advance what the right way of action is, since the effects cannot be
foreseen. That is the state of doubt, which puts the mind to work in spite of the momentary
uncertainty.
In such cases of doubt, the mind recalls the multiplicity of sensations experienced so far from its
inventory of memories (CP 5.395) and selects those patterns of action that make it possible to adapt to
the circumstances that created doubt. It is through the above process that humans shape their world, as
a system of signs, making it increasingly complex, with patterns of action based on the production of
habits. It is thus characteristic of belief that it contributes to the creation of habits (CP 5.398). These
latter are, in turn, schemes of action generating the regular occurrence of events. These schemes, how-
ever, do not appear in their original form, but take on additional meanings through the sign processes,
with these meanings resulting from the underlying multiplicity of experience. It is in this way that
meanings become increasingly dense (‘symbols grow’, cf. CP 2.302).
The third and final stage of the process is the emergence of units through the systematisation of
patterns of action. These are the habits, which are in fact the condensed forms of experience-based
schemes of action. Habits can be identified according to their way of directing behaviour,
namely how and when they motivate specific actions, aimed at specific (recognisable) results (cf.
CP 5.400).
3.3 Peirce’s phenomenological categories
Ashas been recently argued by several scholars, understanding Peirce’s phenomenological categories is of
key importance for any attempt to make his semiotics fruitful for the study of law (see Pearson, 2008a;
2008b; Hausman, 2008; Colapietro, 2008). These categories all refer to experience and represent the
level of complexity of a given sign process as well as that of the world as a system of signs. Peirce distin-
guished three categories, which he termed ‘Firstness’, ‘Secondness’ and ‘Thirdness’, respectively. Firstness
refers to the ‘quality of sensation’, directed at individual and unrelated things and phenomena (cf. CP
1.356–357). Secondness, ‘actuality’, presupposes a certain relationship between two things, even though
that relationship is still not conscious (cf. CP 1.358). Finally, Thirdness is ‘a category of continuity’ of the
interpreting activity (cf. CP 1.361). Law can be considered to belong to that latter category.20
The distinctive element of Thirdness is the appearance of a third factor (the interpretant) in the
functioning of signs,21 which is capable of making a connection between two things that are appar-
ently unrelated.22 It is through the making of these connections that the interpretive community
can create increasingly complex signs. Moreover, it is also at that level that symbolic and metaphoric
20‘Law as an active force is second, but order and legislation are third’ (CP 1.337).
21See Hausman’s (2008, p. 211) example of the dropped coin. If someone drops a coin on the street (without realising it)
and someone else comes along and picks it up, then there is a twofold relation. The first relation exists between the person
dropping the coin and the coin itself, and the second between the person finding the coin and the coin. In the first case, we
are dealing with Secondness, due to the lack of being conscious of having dropped the coin. There is no mental relation
between the person dropping the coin and the one finding it, as it is only through the object (the coin) that they are in
an indirect relation.
22Thirdness is an aspect of cognition and experience bridging the gap between the ‘absolute first and last’ (cf. CP 1.337:
‘The beginning is first, the end second, the middle third. The end is second, the means third’).
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thinking can appear, since the associative making of meaning by the interpretant is guided by already
existing customs and traditions. Using these categories, Peirce tried to emphasise that it is through the
interpreting activity that meaning can be attributed to the world surrounding us.23
There have always been certain rules for that process of attribution of meaning, for it is not indif-
ferent what pattern one uses for interpreting a given thing or phenomenon. As we have seen, the chain
of experience related to the respective thing or phenomenon plays a major role in shaping these pat-
terns of interpretation. Hence, the importance of customs (‘habit’) and traditions, as well as the limited
freedom of the interpretant in attributing meaning. Accordingly, it is due to the underlying chain of
experience that a legal act or legal text will be interpreted in a different framework than everyday
behaviour or literary works. The law belongs to Thirdness, because it needs to be interpreted to be
able to have an effect on its environment. In legal sign relations, the relation between the interpretants
is usually conscious (e.g. in cases of gifts, contracts or marriages) and not established by mere chance
(as in Secondness). Also, in order to make an impact, the legal system of signs needs to have charac-
teristically legal patterns, which direct the activity of the interpreters in the way corresponding to the
ends of law. Although the Thirdness of the legal system of signs works at the surface level, processes
below that level, too, need to be taken into account. These latter have an impact on the very charac-
teristics of law’s Thirdness, namely how legal signs are interpreted and how these frameworks of inter-
pretation (‘habits’) are rooted in experience. Even though law is Thirdness in a primary sense, its
surface level is based on Firstness and Secondness.
With the above phenomenological categories being based in experience, Peirce distinguished a fur-
ther category – one that refers to the stage preceding semiosis. That one he called ‘Ground’ and, unlike
the three others, it is not one of experience, but provides an instinctive direction for the attribution of
meaning by the interpretant.24 Ground comprises principles and ideas, which, while non-rational, are
nevertheless capable of becoming rational in sign processes (cf. CP 1.358). According to Peirce, that
intuitive capacity25 is human beings’ share in the work of Creation.
Ground is inaccessible for any stylistic analysis, given that it has no connections to experience (i.e. there is
no ‘condensed’, symbolic knowledge in it), although it is coveredby layers ofmeaning.26 Its elements still are
of importance in terms of style, since the verified and condensed patterns of action, which form the basic
structure, are permanent because they have been checked against those ideas of the Ground.
4 A pragmatist semiotic concept of legal style
From the dynamic character of semiosis and the belonging of law to the category of Thirdness, it fol-
lows that the legal system of signs is one where right interpretation (the one corresponding to the prag-
matic end of law as a system of norms, i.e. regulating human behaviour) depends on the interpreter’s
recognition of the legal quality of a given action. Thus, interpretive patterns serving the aim of sim-
plification appear in law as well. Their complex, the ‘habit’ that is characteristic of law, needs linguistic
expression to be communicated to the interpreters. That is, legal ‘habit’ appears in legal ‘style’. Yet, due
to the dynamic and open nature of law as a system of signs (cf. Section 3.1 above), it is not only pure
‘legal’ experience that plays a role in the creation of legal ‘habit’: other sorts of social, cultural or eco-
nomic experience all have their impact. The concept of style derived from Peircean semiotics thus fits
with the cultural definition of style.
That also corresponds to an insight formulated by Roberta Kevelson, one of the chief exponents of
the pragmatist current within twentieth-century legal semiotics. In her book, The Law as a System of
23The ‘reliable method’ of interpreting phenomena was one of Peirce’s core interests. It was in connection with it that he
described the method of abductive reasoning (see Paavola, 2005). On the relationship between forms of inference and the
categories, see Staat (1993).
24In a passage (CP 6. 467), Peirce calls them the ‘Sign’s Soul’, which function as links between the object of the sign and the
mind of the interpreter.
25Even the exploratory use of abduction, the instinct of right reason, is based on that (cf. Sebeok and Sebeok, 1980, p. 44).
26As Peirce put it: ‘a pure idea without metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion without a peel’ (EP 2.392).
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Signs (1988), Kevelson seeks to grasp the nature of the legal system of signs. She argues that, in the case
of the law, experience-based habits need to continuously align themselves with the changing needs of
the society surrounding them, since law is a dynamic system of signs with the role to represent values
corresponding to social needs and principles of action. Legal codes (signs) are, then, ‘mirrors of soci-
ety’, with the legal discourse being a symbolic kind of discourse. That relates to the notion of ‘condens-
ing’ experience: the law produces symbols from its verified knowledge, thus providing patterns of
human behaviour.27 In doing so, law is influenced by schemes of experience gained in other fields,
such as habits that have emerged in the economy, the family or other cultural institutions
(Kevelson, 1988, pp. 9, 14–15). Neither the legally relevant forms of behaviour (e.g. making a contract)
nor their definitions or qualifications (the criteria of validity) are ‘legal’ in the sense that they would be
created by the law. What the law qua law does within that process is to formulate certain standards
with reference to certain social practices, in a form that is accessible to its addressees.
The determining influence of style on interpretation also appears in the pragmatist semiotic con-
cept of style. According to Peirce, ‘habit’ is a determining factor28 in the process of signification. Thus,
the basic structure of the legal system of signs consists of ‘habits’, the persistence of which is guaran-
teed by stylistic elements, such as metaphors or symbols.29
Peirce’s concept of symbol is characterised not so much by arbitrariness or conventionality, but by
its relation to ‘habit’. For him, symbols are signs that fuel the emergence and shaping of ever-changing
habits (‘the virtue of a growing habit’, cf. Nöth, 2010, p. 82). In law, these ‘habits’ need to be main-
tained, since the law, as an open and dynamic system of signs, modifies its frames and borders accord-
ing to the needs to change, while it also needs to offer patterns of orientation, so the interpretants can
accommodate past principles and insights to the requirements of the present and interpreters can draw
some conclusions as to the expectations of the future on the basis of their knowledge.30
The phenomenological categories are also helpful in highlighting the limits of stylistic analysis. Peircean
semiotics teaches us that what is accessible for such investigations needs to be based on past experience (the
discovery of ‘habits’), with its (present) impact being perceivable. For Peirce, law (as a principle) is purely
mental content andwhat legal rulesdo is to communicate that (ideal) legal content through linguistic expres-
sion. As he put it, ‘right is amatter of law, and law is amatter of thought andmeaning’ (CP 1.475). Given the
‘incapacities’ described by Peirce (cf. note 19 above), there is no way to get to knowledge directly.
Moreover, the interpretation of law through the examination of its style is necessarily limited due to
the complexity of law as a system of signs.31 A stylistic analysis is not going to provide us with an
explanation concerning the ‘true’ or ‘essential’ meaning of a legal sign, based on some common net-
work of meanings. What can be grasped this way is rather the effect of the thought content expressed
through style. The impact of law on its environment takes place through the attribution of meaning
and law exerts that influence through its style. What the examination of style can contribute to our
understanding is to show by what means the law governs its own interpretation, seeking to bring
about meanings the effects of which comply with the general aims of its system, but also the ways
in which the very acts of interpretation set limits to that influence.
27Here, Kevelson (1988, p. 11) quotes Oliver Wendell Holmes, who regarded the Constitution as the most precise represen-
tation of a nation’s legal knowledge, also calling it ‘an experience’.
28Peirce describes ‘habit’ using the terms ‘regularity’, ‘general rule’ and ‘acquired law’ (cf. CP 2.292).
29In the sense of Peirce’s metaphoric speech, a sign is not something artificial, but a living conception, rooted in practices
such as communication and cognition (cf. Bergman, 2009, p. 79).
30Another parallel here is with the interpretive concept of ‘recursiveness’, developed by Norbert Wiener in a cybernetic
context (see Wiener, 1948; 1950), and later applied in various fields, from ethnology to political science. Iser (2000,
pp. 91, 113) regards recursiveness as a ‘creative force’, which makes it possible for the system to maintain itself through
the adaptation of earlier patterns, as well as the emergence of higher-order complex systems.
31It is at that point that Eco finds a parallel between Peirce’s (pragmatist) and Hjelmslev’s (structuralist) theories.
According to Hjelmslev (1953), linguistics can have no pretention to being scientific beyond certain limits, determined by
the ‘content’. That latter is reflected by the signs used for expressing it, which therefore cannot be ‘complete’. The continuum,
before taking on the form of the substance through language, ‘is everything and nothing and therefore eludes all determin-
ation’ (Eco, 2000, p. 52).
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5 Conclusion
Seeking to find a perspective that allows a ‘synoptic’ approach to legal style, this paper started from the
insight that, in order to do so, one needs to identify a middle level between the ‘surface’ and the ‘deep
structure’ of law as a system of signs. That is necessary, since the deep structure, on the one hand, does
not contain elements that would be accessible to any stylistic classification (or that could be perceived
as ‘legal’). On the other hand, the surface, where ‘style’ and ‘law’ are perceived, does not allow a unified
description of either the concept or the functioning of legal style.
The doctrine of semiotics developed by Charles S. Peirce does offer such an intermediary level
(which we termed ‘basic structure’) through the concept of ‘habit’. We hope to have shown that the
three levels thus distinguished prove fruitful in understanding style within the semiotic system of
law. First, there is its surface structure, with the pragmatic functions of stylistic elements depending
on the respective field of law. Within a domestic legal system, for instance, it is at that level that we
can grasp the difference between, say, private and public law: the former is meant to establish stan-
dards for interactions among equals (mostly private individuals and their associations), while the latter
deals with relations involving the state and its agencies. From the perspective of style, we can observe,
among others, differences in terms of the linguistic structure of statutes or how specific terms are
interpreted (e.g. ‘right’ referring to possible ways of actions and conditions of validity in private trans-
actions, and expectations and limits to state actions in constitutional or administrative law). The basis
of these interpretations, in turn, can be found within the basic structure as ‘condensed’ patterns and
schemes of action (‘habits’), based on experience. It is here, for instance, that the concept of ‘validity’
or ‘normativity’ can be grasped. The working mechanism of the basic structure is partly similar to the
third, deep structure, as its way of functioning often remains unreflected by the interpreters. The dif-
ference between the two is that the deep structure contains all the preconditions for the emergence of
habits, such as the rules of natural languages and other forms of thinking and communication.
A unified approach to style in law seems possible only in terms of the basic structure. There, the experi-
ential background of habits can be uncovered through the symbols and metaphors that make for their (con-
densed) linguistic expression.The realityof a symbolwas consideredbyPeirce to consist of the symbol’s fitting
to the facts of reality, while having an influence on the thought and behaviourof those interpreting that reality
(cf. CP 4.447). That insight invites to situate style in relation to the concept of culture (for which the work of
Karl Mannheim provides a source of inspiration). In Peircean terms, it is the interpretive activity of human
beings that produces the whole of culture, within which ‘legal’ elements are then separated. Style functions
within the framework of interpreting cultural contents and thus contributes to the (re)production of culture,
including legal culture. That process can be described with the Peircean chain of belief, doubt and habit.
In understanding style in law, habit can be regarded as the abstraction of experience-based rules
and practices, which are also conditioned by certain anthropological facts, human capacities and
incapacities that determine the deep structure. Yet, the application of, and reflection on, these rules
and practices happens through the use of signs that appear at the surface. That use, then, is ‘distilled
back’ into further abstractions, thus bringing about an ever-changing and still relatively stable system
of meanings, which can be summarised in the concept of legal culture.
By focusing on these sign processes, both individually and as complex systems, a semiotic approach
to legal style has got the promise of a common methodological basis, useful for micro and macro ana-
lyses alike. Whether comparing the ‘thinking styles’ of French and English law (as done e.g. by
Catherine Valcke in the present volume) or using stylistic analysis as a diagnostic device (see e.g.
Bencze, 2015), it is possible to go beyond the level of the surface structure, identifying patterns and
formulating explanations within the same, semiotic, conceptual framework.
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